generate

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 30, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external sources, including reusable style fragments in generations/styles.json and user-supplied reference images in generations/refs/, which are then used to build prompts for AI generation.
  • Ingestion points: SKILL.md describes loading prompt fragments from generations/styles.json; recipe files in the models/ directory (e.g., models/gpt-image-2.md) use reference image paths.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not provide delimiters or specific 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings when these inputs are interpolated into model calls.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands via kie-cli (subprocess calls) and perform file-system writes to the generations/ directory.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation logic is defined for the content of style fragments or image metadata.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The model recipe files (such as models/nano-banana-2-lite.md) instruct the agent to execute shell commands using kie-cli. These commands include arguments like --prompt and --refs which are directly derived from user input and external file content.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: For asynchronous video generation models (e.g., models/kling-3.0.md, models/veo-3.1.md), the skill's defined workflow involves downloading media files from external URLs provided by the AI service provider (Kie AI) after the task is completed.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 30, 2026, 10:48 AM