generate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external sources, including reusable style fragments in
generations/styles.jsonand user-supplied reference images ingenerations/refs/, which are then used to build prompts for AI generation. - Ingestion points:
SKILL.mddescribes loading prompt fragments fromgenerations/styles.json; recipe files in themodels/directory (e.g.,models/gpt-image-2.md) use reference image paths. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not provide delimiters or specific 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings when these inputs are interpolated into model calls.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands via
kie-cli(subprocess calls) and perform file-system writes to thegenerations/directory. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation logic is defined for the content of style fragments or image metadata.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The model recipe files (such as
models/nano-banana-2-lite.md) instruct the agent to execute shell commands usingkie-cli. These commands include arguments like--promptand--refswhich are directly derived from user input and external file content. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: For asynchronous video generation models (e.g.,
models/kling-3.0.md,models/veo-3.1.md), the skill's defined workflow involves downloading media files from external URLs provided by the AI service provider (Kie AI) after the task is completed.
Audit Metadata