The Agent Skills Directory

[COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on shell commands to interact with a non-standard external CLI tool (codex). It uses bash to execute functions like codex exec and codex resume, which increases the attack surface for the environment.
[DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions require the agent to parse a thread_id from the JSON output of a previous shell command and then interpolate that variable directly into a subsequent shell command (codex exec resume "$THREAD_ID" ...). This implementation pattern is vulnerable to shell command injection if the external tool provides a malicious string as a thread_id, potentially allowing for unauthorized command execution on the host system.
[INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests user-influenced data (the plan generated in Act 1) and passes it to a remote adversarial reviewer model (Codex). This presents a vulnerability surface where malicious instructions embedded in the plan could attempt to override the reviewer's safety guidelines or persona.
Ingestion points: PLAN.md, which is generated based on the grilling phase (Act 1) involving direct user input.
Boundary markers: The review prompt uses persona instructions and output formatting rules but lacks explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the content of PLAN.md.
Capability inventory: The skill utilizes subprocess calls (codex exec) to interact with external services.
Sanitization: No sanitization or validation is performed on the plan content or the parsed thread_id before they are used in sensitive contexts.

grill-me-codex