notebooklm

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 30, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of a third-party Python package notebooklm-py from an unverified repository (teng-lin/notebooklm-py) using uv tool install. This package handles sensitive browser-based authentication flows for Google accounts to access NotebookLM services.\n- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The instructions describe the use of high-risk authentication methods, including browser session capture for local logins and the use of a --master-token for headless or CI/CD environments. The management of these long-lived credentials by a third-party tool represents a sensitive data handling risk.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it is designed to ingest data from untrusted sources.\n
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through URL imports (notebooklm source add --url), deep web research agents (notebooklm research add-web), and Google Drive file discovery (notebooklm research add-drive).\n
  • Boundary markers: There are no instructions provided to the agent to use delimiters or ignore instructions embedded within these imported sources.\n
  • Capability inventory: The skill enables the agent to perform file system operations (downloading audio/video/json artifacts), network requests, and configuration changes.\n
  • Sanitization: There is no mention of filtering or sanitizing the content fetched from external URLs before it is queried or summarized by the AI.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses potentially impactful commands like notebooklm doctor --fix, which performs automated repairs on the local environment, and notebooklm mcp install, which modifies the configuration files of other installed AI agent tools.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 30, 2026, 10:49 AM