google-workspace-cli
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains an indirect prompt injection surface as it is designed to ingest and process untrusted data from Gmail, Drive, and Sheets without explicit boundary markers.
- Ingestion points: Retrieval of external data occurs through
gws gmail users.messages list,gws drive files list, andgws sheets spreadsheets.values getas documented inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore potentially malicious instructions embedded in the retrieved content.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute local Python scripts, run shell commands via the
gwsCLI, and send outgoing emails throughgws gmail users.messages send. - Sanitization: No evidence of data sanitization or input validation is present in the provided command sequences before processing external content.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of multiple system commands and local Python scripts, including
scripts/gws_doctor.py,scripts/output_analyzer.py, andscripts/workspace_audit.py. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation provides instructions for installing the
gwsCLI from the npm registry (@anthropic/gws), the Cargo registry (gws-cli), and official binaries from the Google Workspace GitHub repository. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill's architecture combines read access to sensitive user data (emails, files, calendars) with the ability to write or transmit data (sending emails, uploading to Drive), creating a potential pathway for data exfiltration if the agent processes malicious data containing exfiltration instructions.
Audit Metadata