agentmemory-rest-api
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECREDENTIALS_UNSAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill instructs the agent to programmatically read a sensitive credential file located at
~/.agentmemory/secretor~/.agentmemory/.envto authenticate API requests. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The instructions establish a pattern of reading a local secret and transmitting it via
Authorizationheaders incurlrequests. While the default target islocalhost, the skill mentions support for remote daemons, which creates a potential exfiltration vector if the agent is directed to a malicious endpoint. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function is to retrieve and store information in a memory server. Content retrieved via
/agentmemory/smart-searchor/agentmemory/recallis intended to be used by the agent, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection if the stored data contains malicious instructions. - Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through responses from search and recall endpoints defined in
REFERENCE.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore' instructions when the agent processes retrieved memory content.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses shell commands (
curl) and local file reads (cat). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization or validation for data retrieved from the REST API before it is processed by the LLM.
Audit Metadata