auto-review-loop-minimax

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 18, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses ~/.claude/settings.json to retrieve the MINIMAX_API_KEY. This is a sensitive platform-level configuration file that may contain other private settings or credentials.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill transmits extensive research context, including project narrative documents and recent experiment results, to an external API (api.minimax.io). While this is a well-known service, the automated transfer of proprietary research data to a third party should be carefully considered.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection by design. It treats 'action items' returned by an external model as instructions to be implemented via file modifications and shell commands.
  • Ingestion points: External API responses from MiniMax chat completions (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: None present to distinguish instructions from the external model from trusted logic.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes Bash(*), Write, Edit, and Agent tools to modify code and execute commands.
  • Sanitization: No validation or sanitization process is described before implementing changes suggested by the external model.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs automated script generation and execution based on external input. It is specifically instructed to deploy experiments to GPU servers via SSH and manage them in screen/tmux sessions autonomously.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions include a fallback mechanism to bypass tool limitations by silently using shell redirection (cat << 'EOF') for file writes without informing the user or seeking permission.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jul 18, 2026, 04:51 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — auto-review-loop-minimax