auto-review-loop-minimax
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 18, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses
~/.claude/settings.jsonto retrieve theMINIMAX_API_KEY. This is a sensitive platform-level configuration file that may contain other private settings or credentials. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill transmits extensive research context, including project narrative documents and recent experiment results, to an external API (
api.minimax.io). While this is a well-known service, the automated transfer of proprietary research data to a third party should be carefully considered. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection by design. It treats 'action items' returned by an external model as instructions to be implemented via file modifications and shell commands.
- Ingestion points: External API responses from MiniMax chat completions (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: None present to distinguish instructions from the external model from trusted logic.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
Bash(*),Write,Edit, andAgenttools to modify code and execute commands. - Sanitization: No validation or sanitization process is described before implementing changes suggested by the external model.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs automated script generation and execution based on external input. It is specifically instructed to deploy experiments to GPU servers via SSH and manage them in screen/tmux sessions autonomously.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions include a fallback mechanism to bypass tool limitations by silently using shell redirection (
cat << 'EOF') for file writes without informing the user or seeking permission.
Audit Metadata