mermaid-diagram
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 18, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill contains a shell command injection vulnerability in Step 4. The instructions direct the agent to execute
mmdcandnpxusing a<diagram-name>that is derived from user-provided$ARGUMENTSin Step 3. If the agent is successfully persuaded to use a filename containing shell metacharacters (e.g.,;,`, or$(...)), it will lead to arbitrary code execution on the host system when verifying the Mermaid syntax. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses
npxto fetch and execute the@mermaid-js/mermaid-clipackage from the official npm registry. While this is a well-known service and a legitimate tool for the skill's purpose, it involves downloading and executing external code at runtime. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user data via
$ARGUMENTSin Step 1 without any structural isolation or boundary markers. This exposes the agent to indirect prompt injection attacks where a user can provide instructions that override the skill's logic. - Ingestion points: User-provided requirements are parsed directly from
$ARGUMENTSin Step 1. - Boundary markers: None present; there are no delimiters (like XML tags) or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the input.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to the
Bashtool, as well asRead,Write, andEditfile operations. - Sanitization: There is no explicit validation or sanitization logic to filter the input or the derived filenames before they are passed to shell commands.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata