research-review
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 18, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill gathers project narrative documents, README files, paper drafts, and experiment history files to send them to an external LLM via the
mcp__codex__codextool. This creates a data exfiltration path for potentially sensitive intellectual property or research data. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The prerequisite section instructs the user to install an unverified MCP server using the command
codex mcp-server. This represents a dependency on an external, non-standard package from an unknown source. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection. It reads untrusted content from research files and interpolates it directly into the prompt sent to the Codex tool.
- Ingestion points: Reads project files (STORY.md, README.md, paper drafts, memory/notes) in SKILL.md Step 1.
- Boundary markers: None. The files are compiled into a 'detailed briefing' and sent in Round 1 without delimiters or safety warnings for the recipient model.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
mcp__codex__codexandmcp__codex__codex-replyto communicate externally, andWrite/Editto modify local files based on the external model's output. - Sanitization: No sanitization is performed on the content of the research files before they are sent to the external service.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requests
Bash(*)permissions and provides an installation command for a local server, which could lead to unauthorized command execution if the server package is malicious.
Audit Metadata