asana-automation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes untrusted data from Asana.
- Ingestion points: Tools such as
ASANA_GET_A_TASK,ASANA_GET_TASKS_FROM_A_PROJECT, andASANA_SEARCH_TASKS_IN_WORKSPACEretrieve user-controlled content like task names and notes. - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not provide delimiters or specific guidelines for the agent to distinguish between its instructions and the data retrieved from Asana.
- Capability inventory: The skill has significant write/delete capabilities, including
ASANA_CREATE_A_TASK,ASANA_SUBMIT_PARALLEL_REQUESTS(bulk operations), and various project management tools. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation logic is specified for the data retrieved from the Asana API.
- [SAFE]: The skill uses
RUBE_MANAGE_CONNECTIONSfor authentication. This is a secure practice that relies on OAuth rather than hardcoded API keys or secrets. - [SAFE]: The skill references
rube.appandcomposio.dev. These are established services in the AI agent ecosystem for providing toolkits and MCP infrastructure.
Audit Metadata