developer-growth-analysis

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 18, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill is configured to read the local history file ~/.claude/history.jsonl. This file contains the complete record of user interactions, including code snippets and sensitive project data in the pastedContents field. The skill then processes this information into a report that is transmitted to an external Slack workspace via the 'Rube MCP' toolset. While this is the primary functionality of the skill, it represents a significant data exposure risk if the logs contain sensitive secrets or if the delivery target is misconfigured.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes untrusted data from historical chat logs and includes it in the final report without sanitization. Ingestion points: Reads the display and pastedContents fields from ~/.claude/history.jsonl (Instruction 1). Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions or delimiters provided to prevent the agent from following malicious instructions that might be embedded in the historical chat data or code snippets. Capability inventory: Ability to send data to Slack and search HackerNews via Rube MCP. Sanitization: Absent. The skill does not perform any escaping or validation of the content extracted from the history logs before using it to generate the report or sending it to Slack.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jul 18, 2026, 04:24 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — developer-growth-analysis