Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses several command-line tools for processing PDF documents, including
pdftotext,qpdf,pdftk,pdftoppm, andpdfimages. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an indirect prompt injection surface because it extracts and processes text from untrusted PDF documents using libraries like
pypdfandpdfplumber. - Ingestion points:
SKILL.md,scripts/check_fillable_fields.py,scripts/extract_form_field_info.py,scripts/fill_fillable_fields.py, andscripts/fill_pdf_form_with_annotations.pyinvolve reading external PDF files. - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or warnings are used to separate extracted data from agent instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses file write permissions, shell execution capabilities, and image conversion tools.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering applied to the extracted PDF text.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Procedural instructions in
forms.mdutilize imperative language ("CRITICAL: You MUST complete these steps in order") to enforce a specific workflow for form-filling tasks. - [SAFE]: The script
scripts/fill_fillable_fields.pyimplements a runtime monkeypatch ofpypdf.generic.DictionaryObject.get_inherited. This is a documented technical workaround to fix a specific bug in the library's handling of selection list fields and does not represent a security threat.
Audit Metadata