webapp-testing
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 18, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/with_server.pyfacilitates arbitrary command execution. It usessubprocess.Popenwithshell=Trueto launch server processes andsubprocess.runto execute automation commands. This pattern allows the agent to execute complex shell strings, which increases the risk of command injection if arguments are not strictly controlled. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
SKILL.mdfile contains instructions that explicitly steer the agent away from analyzing the implementation details of its own scripts ("DO NOT read the source until you try running the script first"). This discourages the agent from identifying potential security flaws like the use ofshell=Truein the helper scripts. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exposes a surface for indirect prompt injection by processing external data from local web applications.
- Ingestion points: Browser console logs are captured and stored in
examples/console_logging.py, and page content is processed inexamples/element_discovery.pyandSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are used to distinguish untrusted web content from legitimate agent instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute shell commands via the
scripts/with_server.pyutility script. - Sanitization: The skill lacks mechanisms to sanitize or filter captured logs and page data before they are analyzed by the agent.
Audit Metadata