k8s-cli

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 9, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PERSISTENCE]: The skill documentation encourages the user to modify shell configuration files (~/.bashrc or ~/.zshrc) to add aliases for the kubectl-mcp-server tool. While standard for CLI tools, this involves the modification of persistent environment files.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the ingestion of data from a Kubernetes cluster that may be influenced by external actors.
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context through tools like kubectl_get, kubectl_logs, and MCP resources such as pods://{namespace}, events://{namespace}, and services://{namespace}.
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters defined to separate cluster data from agent instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill includes high-privilege capabilities such as scaling deployments (kubectl_scale) and installing software via Helm (install_helm_chart).
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the ingested cluster data is specified in the skill instructions beyond an environment variable for masking secrets (MCP_MASK_SECRETS).
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 9, 2026, 06:52 PM