k8s-multicluster
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process data from external Kubernetes clusters, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious data in the cluster could influence agent behavior.\n
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context via
kubectl_get,capi_get_cluster,helm_list,gitops_apps_list,cilium_list_nodes, andistio_proxy_status(found inSKILL.mdandCONTEXT-SWITCHING.md).\n - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any delimiters or warnings to ignore potentially malicious instructions embedded within the retrieved Kubernetes resource data or logs.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant operational capabilities including
kubectl_apply(resource creation/modification),install_helm_chart(software deployment),capi_scale_machinedeployment(infrastructure scaling), andgitops_app_sync(synchronization triggers).\n - Sanitization: There are no visible mechanisms for sanitizing, validating, or filtering the content retrieved from the Kubernetes API before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata