create-profile
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests free-form user input and writes it to a persistent profile file (~/.claude/PROFILE.md) intended to be read by other skills to influence their behavior. This creates a vulnerability where malicious instructions stored in the profile could hijack subsequent agent actions.
- Ingestion points: User responses collected via the
AskUserQuestiontool throughout the interview process inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The generated profile markdown does not include delimiters or specific instructions for other skills to treat the content as untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the
Writetool to persist data to the local file system. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation is performed on the user-provided strings before writing them to the profile file.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Writetool to modify the local file system at~/.claude/PROFILE.md. While the scope is restricted to this specific path in theallowed-toolsfrontmatter, it represents a direct write capability based on external input.
Audit Metadata