frontend
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill directs the agent to fetch and run external packages from the NPM registry. Specifically, it mentions the
slop-detectorpackage inSKILL.mdand the@google/design.mdpackage inreferences/design-md-authoring.md. The use ofnpxwithout pinned versions allows for the execution of arbitrary code updates from the public registry. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill leverages the
npxutility to execute remote code as part of its standard workflow. - An optional step in the
critiquemode callsnpx slop-detectorto analyze UI patterns. - The design validation workflow requires running
npx @google/design.md lint DESIGN.md. While the latter is associated with a well-known organization, the execution mechanism itself remains a vector for remote code. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill explicitly grants and uses the
Bashtool to perform design linting and UI analysis, providing the agent with a powerful environment that could be abused if compromised. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The critique and authoring modes create a surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting and processing potentially untrusted UI code files.
- Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read, grep, and glob built UI components and external configuration files (e.g.,
DESIGN.md). - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit instructions or delimiters to prevent the agent from following instructions embedded within the code it is reviewing.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to
BashandLSPtools, which increases the potential impact of an indirect injection attack. - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing or filtering the source code files before they are read into the agent's context.
Audit Metadata