pi-customization
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill documents mechanisms for overriding the agent's system prompt using files like
.pi/SYSTEM.md,~/.pi/agent/SYSTEM.md, andAPPEND_SYSTEM.md. This architecture allows the agent's behavior to be influenced by instructions found in the workspace, creating a surface where malicious instructions could be embedded in a project to hijack agent behavior. - Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read content from
.pi/SYSTEM.md,~/.pi/agent/SYSTEM.md, andAPPEND_SYSTEM.md(found inSKILL.mdandCORPUS.md). - Boundary markers: There are no documented delimiters or instructions to treat these external files as untrusted content; they are explicitly used to define the system prompt behavior.
- Capability inventory: The agent is given capabilities to write configuration files and change UI/keybinding settings (found in the 'Workflows' section).
- Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the Markdown content is mentioned before it is appended to or replaces the system prompt.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references an external repository for documentation and verified source code.
- Reference: The canonical remote is identified as
https://github.com/badlogic/pi-monoinreferences/CORPUS.md.
Audit Metadata