candid-fast-ship
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to execute arbitrary shell commands defined in the project's
.candid/config.jsonfile (specificallyinstallCommand,buildCommand,testCommand, andpostMergeCommand). While this is the intended purpose of a shipping tool, it allows for command execution based on local configuration content. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection. It ingests untrusted data from the local configuration file and interpolates it into agent prompts.
- Ingestion points:
.candid/config.json(fields:ship.additionalPrompt,ship.issueTracker.prompt). - Boundary markers: None specified in the instructions to isolate these strings from the base instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to execute subprocesses (shell commands), create pull requests, and update external issue trackers.
- Sanitization: There is no mention of escaping or validating the content of these prompt fields before they are processed by the agent.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill includes a reference to an external GitHub repository (
github.com/ron-myers/candid) in the pull request footer. This repository is owned by the skill's author.
Audit Metadata