candid-ship
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to execute arbitrary shell commands defined in the
.candid/config.jsonconfiguration file, specifically forinstallCommand,buildCommand,testCommand, andpostMergeCommand. This enables the agent to perform extensive operations on the host system. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The execution of user-defined commands, such as the
curlexample provided for thepostMergeCommand, allows for downloading and potentially executing remote scripts or triggering external webhooks during the workflow. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from the repository environment, including branch names and commit subjects, and user-provided context via
additionalPrompt. These inputs are interpolated into pull request descriptions and passed to sub-tasks like code reviews without explicit sanitization. - Ingestion points: Reads
additionalPromptfrom configuration; extractscurrentBranchandcommitSubjectsfrom git logs and branch metadata. - Boundary markers: Lacks explicit delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore potentially malicious commands embedded in the interpolated content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to shell execution, GitHub CLI (gh), git, and the Linear MCP tool.
- Sanitization: No evidence of input validation or escaping for the
additionalPromptbefore it is passed to thecandid-looptool. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The workflow encourages and executes the installation of external dependencies using package managers like npm or pnpm, which involve fetching code from public registries at runtime.
Audit Metadata