skills/ron-myers/candid/candid-ship/Gen Agent Trust Hub

candid-ship

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to execute arbitrary shell commands defined in the .candid/config.json configuration file, specifically for installCommand, buildCommand, testCommand, and postMergeCommand. This enables the agent to perform extensive operations on the host system.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The execution of user-defined commands, such as the curl example provided for the postMergeCommand, allows for downloading and potentially executing remote scripts or triggering external webhooks during the workflow.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from the repository environment, including branch names and commit subjects, and user-provided context via additionalPrompt. These inputs are interpolated into pull request descriptions and passed to sub-tasks like code reviews without explicit sanitization.
  • Ingestion points: Reads additionalPrompt from configuration; extracts currentBranch and commitSubjects from git logs and branch metadata.
  • Boundary markers: Lacks explicit delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore potentially malicious commands embedded in the interpolated content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to shell execution, GitHub CLI (gh), git, and the Linear MCP tool.
  • Sanitization: No evidence of input validation or escaping for the additionalPrompt before it is passed to the candid-loop tool.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The workflow encourages and executes the installation of external dependencies using package managers like npm or pnpm, which involve fetching code from public registries at runtime.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 18, 2026, 11:45 PM