cicd-hardening
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFE
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Static analysis identified a potentially destructive command
rm -rf /within theSKILL.mdfile. Upon manual review, this command is used as a technical example to illustrate a 'poisoned pipeline execution' attack via expression injection. It is an educational example of a vulnerability to be avoided, not an instruction for the agent to execute. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references several external security tools and documentation sources, including
zizmor,actionlint,OpenSSF Scorecard, andcosign. All referenced URLs and tools originate from trusted organizations or well-able well-known service repositories (e.g., GitHub, GitLab, Google, Amazon, OpenSSF, and the Center for Internet Security). These references are used to provide the agent with authoritative context for performing CI/CD security reviews. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and analyze untrusted data in the form of CI/CD configuration files (e.g.,
.github/workflows/*.yml) provided by users or from repository forks. - Ingestion points: Reads workflow definitions and configuration files (
SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The skill does not explicitly instruct the agent to use boundary markers or delimiters when processing these files.
- Capability inventory: The skill primarily performs analysis and generates a report. It suggests hand-offs to other specialized skills for tasks like SAST or secret scanning.
- Sanitization: There are no explicit instructions for the agent to sanitize the content of the files before processing.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: No attempts to bypass safety filters or override system instructions were detected. The skill uses standard instructional language to define its scope and methodology.
Audit Metadata