cicd-hardening

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 18, 2026

Risk Level: SAFE
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Static analysis identified a potentially destructive command rm -rf / within the SKILL.md file. Upon manual review, this command is used as a technical example to illustrate a 'poisoned pipeline execution' attack via expression injection. It is an educational example of a vulnerability to be avoided, not an instruction for the agent to execute.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references several external security tools and documentation sources, including zizmor, actionlint, OpenSSF Scorecard, and cosign. All referenced URLs and tools originate from trusted organizations or well-able well-known service repositories (e.g., GitHub, GitLab, Google, Amazon, OpenSSF, and the Center for Internet Security). These references are used to provide the agent with authoritative context for performing CI/CD security reviews.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and analyze untrusted data in the form of CI/CD configuration files (e.g., .github/workflows/*.yml) provided by users or from repository forks.
  • Ingestion points: Reads workflow definitions and configuration files (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not explicitly instruct the agent to use boundary markers or delimiters when processing these files.
  • Capability inventory: The skill primarily performs analysis and generates a report. It suggests hand-offs to other specialized skills for tasks like SAST or secret scanning.
  • Sanitization: There are no explicit instructions for the agent to sanitize the content of the files before processing.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: No attempts to bypass safety filters or override system instructions were detected. The skill uses standard instructional language to define its scope and methodology.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
May 18, 2026, 04:30 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — cicd-hardening