intercom-automation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions direct the user to connect to an external MCP server endpoint at
https://rube.app/mcp. This is the primary infrastructure provided by the vendor (Rootcastle) for the skill's functionality and does not involve direct execution of untrusted scripts. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface as it is designed to ingest and process untrusted data from Intercom conversations and contact fields.
- Ingestion points: External data is ingested via tools such as
INTERCOM_GET_CONVERSATION,INTERCOM_SEARCH_CONTACTS, andINTERCOM_LIST_CONVERSATIONSas described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of clear delimiters or 'ignore' instructions for the agent when processing external conversation bodies.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to modify external state by using tools like
INTERCOM_REPLY_TO_CONVERSATION,INTERCOM_CLOSE_CONVERSATION, andINTERCOM_DETACH_A_CONTACT. - Sanitization: The skill documentation includes a specific mitigation note advising the agent to sanitize HTML input in conversation bodies to prevent rendering issues.
Audit Metadata