choom-delegation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates communication between multiple agents, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection where instructions could be embedded in the
taskorcontextarguments. - Ingestion points: Data enters the system through the
taskandcontextparameters of thedelegate_to_choomtool inhandler.tsandtools.ts. - Boundary markers: The skill employs structured headers (e.g.,
## Your Task,## Context from orchestrator) and clearRULESsections to delimit instructions from data passed to the target agent. - Capability inventory: The skill can trigger tool execution in other agents via an internal chat API, record interactions in the database, and manage files in the workspace through delegated worker agents.
- Sanitization: The implementation uses
verifyDelegationClaimsto validate that agents actually performed the file operations they claim to have done. It also truncates long responses to prevent agents from being overwhelmed by large context windows. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
list_teamtool provides metadata about available agents (name, model, and specialization). This information disclosure is restricted to internal database records and is a standard requirement for agent orchestration functionality. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: While the skill orchestrates execution across multiple agents, it does not perform direct shell command execution. Security is maintained by passing a delegation flag to the underlying platform API, which limits the tools and capabilities available to the worker agent.
Audit Metadata