comet-classic
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 9, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing the
cometCLI with various arguments. Instructions inSKILL.md(Step 0) andreference/scripts.mddirect the agent to pass user requests and other variables directly into shell commands (e.g.,comet task <project-root> --task "<original user request>"). This pattern creates a command injection risk if the user input contains shell metacharacters or unmatched quotes that escape the command's intended scope. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from various external sources and interpolates this content into prompts for the main agent and sub-agents. While the skill includes some management of this context, the ingestion of untrusted data into prompts is a known attack surface.
- Ingestion points:
cometCLI JSON outputs,.comet.yamlstate files,tasks.md, and implementation plans containing user-defined tasks. - Boundary markers: The skill mentions using a
Context Manifestfor summaries and application reasons, and uses--expand-contextfor detailed data. - Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute shell commands, manage git repositories, and load other specialized skills.
- Sanitization: The instructions mention injecting only returned text and using summaries, but lack explicit escaping or validation rules for content interpolated into shell commands or sub-agent prompts.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses a coordinator model to dispatch background agents with specialized roles, loading other skills like
subagent-driven-developmentandtest-driven-developmentat runtime. This dynamic loading and execution of specialized agent logic, while central to the workflow, increases the complexity of the execution environment.
Audit Metadata