skills/rpamis/comet/comet-design/Gen Agent Trust Hub

comet-design

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 29, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically searches for and sources a shell script (comet-env.sh) from various locations, including hidden directories in the user's home folder. Sourcing a script from a computed path (. "$COMET_ENV") allows for the execution of arbitrary code if a file with that name is present in any of the searched locations.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes multiple shell commands and scripts ($COMET_STATE, $COMET_HANDOFF, $COMET_GUARD) to manage its workflow and phase transitions.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill's search pattern includes sensitive directories such as $HOME/.config and $HOME/.gemini, which potentially exposes configuration data and agent interaction history to the search process.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an attack surface for indirect prompt injection via the processing of untrusted project artifacts.
  • Ingestion points: Reads data from proposal.md, design.md, tasks.md, and specs/*/spec.md in file SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions are provided to the brainstorming tool to ignore embedded instructions in these files.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands and modify local files.
  • Sanitization: No input validation or sanitization is performed on the ingested content.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
May 29, 2026, 11:22 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — comet-design