mcp-server

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 26, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The file examples/bad-order-tools.java contains a code snippet demonstrating a method execute(String command) that passes arbitrary string input to a shell.run() call. Although this is documented in SKILL.md as a 'Gotcha' and an example of poor tool design ('bad-order-tools'), the pattern itself represents a potential vulnerability for arbitrary command execution.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the creation of tools that ingest untrusted data from an agent via the @McpToolParam annotation (e.g., the orderId parameter in examples/OrderMcpTools.java). This creates a surface area for indirect prompt injection if the processed data contains instructions intended to influence the agent's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: examples/OrderMcpTools.java, examples/good-order-tools.java (parameters passed to methods annotated with @McpTool).
  • Boundary markers: The documentation recommends returning structured DTOs rather than persistence entities, but the examples do not demonstrate the use of specific prompt delimiters or 'ignore' instructions for the parameter values themselves.
  • Capability inventory: Tools created following these patterns have access to application domain services such as OrderService and potentially other backend resources.
  • Sanitization: The SKILL.md documentation provides explicit remediation guidance, advising developers to 'Validate tool arguments and apply domain authorization inside every capability' and to not trust tool hints as a substitute for server-side authorization logic.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 26, 2026, 11:26 AM