mcp-server
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The file
examples/bad-order-tools.javacontains a code snippet demonstrating a methodexecute(String command)that passes arbitrary string input to ashell.run()call. Although this is documented inSKILL.mdas a 'Gotcha' and an example of poor tool design ('bad-order-tools'), the pattern itself represents a potential vulnerability for arbitrary command execution. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the creation of tools that ingest untrusted data from an agent via the
@McpToolParamannotation (e.g., theorderIdparameter inexamples/OrderMcpTools.java). This creates a surface area for indirect prompt injection if the processed data contains instructions intended to influence the agent's behavior. - Ingestion points:
examples/OrderMcpTools.java,examples/good-order-tools.java(parameters passed to methods annotated with@McpTool). - Boundary markers: The documentation recommends returning structured DTOs rather than persistence entities, but the examples do not demonstrate the use of specific prompt delimiters or 'ignore' instructions for the parameter values themselves.
- Capability inventory: Tools created following these patterns have access to application domain services such as
OrderServiceand potentially other backend resources. - Sanitization: The
SKILL.mddocumentation provides explicit remediation guidance, advising developers to 'Validate tool arguments and apply domain authorization inside every capability' and to not trust tool hints as a substitute for server-side authorization logic.
Audit Metadata