app-store
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
iap-finalizersub-skill utilizes theBashtool to execute a local Python utility script (asc.py) using a relative filesystem path (../../_shared/asc-api/asc.py). This script is used to perform GET and POST operations against the App Store Connect API to manage IAP metadata. This execution of local scripts is considered a standard use of functional interfaces for API management. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from
WebSearchresults (used inoriginality-check) and local project planning files (used iniap-finalizer,keyword-optimizer, andmarketing-strategy). This creates a potential surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions could influence agent behavior or command construction. - Ingestion points: External data from web searches and internal project files like
.planning/VALIDATION.mdor.planning/MONETIZATION.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or safety prefixes to separate untrusted data from instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to execute shell commands via
Bashand modify project files usingWriteandEdittools. - Sanitization: The risk is mitigated by strong process-based controls: the agent is instructed to confirm all data with the user via
AskUserQuestionand must perform a mandatory 'dry-run' review, showing the exact command body to the user before using the--applyflag.
Audit Metadata