review
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow in
SKILL.mduses the user-provided$ARGUMENTSdirectly in shell commands (gh pr diff,git diff). An attacker can provide input containing shell metacharacters such as;,&&, or|to execute arbitrary unauthorized commands on the host system. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted source code and diffs from external repositories and passes them to specialized AI sub-agents for review, creating an injection surface.
- Ingestion points: Code context is gathered in
SKILL.mdviagh pr diff,git diff, andread filebased on the$ARGUMENTSvariable. - Boundary markers: None. The skill instructs the agent to provide full file context to reviewers without utilizing delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the code.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute local shell commands (git/gh) and spawn multiple sub-agents with broad instructions.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, escaping, or validation of the retrieved code content before it is interpolated into prompts for the specialized reviewers.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata