skills/rsmdt/the-startup/specify-meta/Gen Agent Trust Hub

specify-meta

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 19, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands by interpolating user-provided variables into a Bash call (e.g., Bash("spec.py \"$featureName\"")). This pattern is susceptible to command injection if the underlying agent platform does not perform strict escaping of shell metacharacters when interpolating variables.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) as it processes data from the local filesystem to guide its logic.
  • Ingestion points: The skill runs spec.py --read to fetch metadata, which parses directory names and file contents within the .start/specs/ and docs/specs/ directories.
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions to the agent to treat the parsed TOML metadata as untrusted or to ignore embedded instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to execute shell commands, create/modify files and directories, and hand off tasks to other document-specific skills.
  • Sanitization: While spec.py sanitizes input when creating new directories using a regex, the read_spec function used for status checks reads and outputs existing directory names and file paths verbatim, which could contain maliciously crafted strings designed to influence the agent's behavior.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Apr 19, 2026, 05:44 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — specify-meta