specify-meta
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 19, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands by interpolating user-provided variables into a
Bashcall (e.g.,Bash("spec.py \"$featureName\"")). This pattern is susceptible to command injection if the underlying agent platform does not perform strict escaping of shell metacharacters when interpolating variables. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) as it processes data from the local filesystem to guide its logic.
- Ingestion points: The skill runs
spec.py --readto fetch metadata, which parses directory names and file contents within the.start/specs/anddocs/specs/directories. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions to the agent to treat the parsed TOML metadata as untrusted or to ignore embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to execute shell commands, create/modify files and directories, and hand off tasks to other document-specific skills.
- Sanitization: While
spec.pysanitizes input when creating new directories using a regex, theread_specfunction used for status checks reads and outputs existing directory names and file paths verbatim, which could contain maliciously crafted strings designed to influence the agent's behavior.
Audit Metadata