fal-ai
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted image data through external models, returning extracted text and layout information to the agent context. This establishes a surface for indirect prompt injection if images contain text specifically crafted to override agent instructions. * Ingestion points: Model results from Moondream and Florence-2 are returned to the agent via
scripts/moondream.pyand referenced in the skill's instructions. * Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters surrounding the ingested model output in the provided prompt templates. * Capability inventory: The skill is capable of file system operations (read/write) and network requests. * Sanitization: Text returned from external models is not sanitized before being presented to the agent. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The utility script
scripts/moondream.pyreads from the user's home directory environment file (~/.env) to locate theFAL_KEY. While functional for locating the service credential, accessing sensitive files in the home directory is a documented data exposure risk. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads generated image masks from the fal.ai CDN (
fal.media) when using the segmentation features. This operation uses theurllib.requestmodule to fetch resources from the service's official infrastructure. The script includes a specific security audit suppression comment (noqa: S310) for this network operation.
Audit Metadata