img-to-html
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process external images (which can be sourced from URLs) and convert their content into functional code and assets. This creates a surface where malicious instructions embedded within an image could influence the agent's output or tool usage.
- Ingestion points: The skill accepts image references via attachment, local path, or URL (
README.md,SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: There are no specific instructions or delimiters provided to the agent to distinguish between legitimate UI content and potentially malicious instructions embedded in the image text.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write files (
index.html,styles.css) and execute shell commands viauv run(SKILL.md). - Sanitization: The instructions lack explicit requirements for the agent to sanitize identifiers (like
slugorid) derived from external filenames or image content before using them in generated code or shell scripts. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to construct and execute shell commands (
uv run,open) using variables derived from the input data. - Evidence: The skill uses
uv run ~/.agents/skills/openrouter-img/scripts/generate_image.pywith parameters like--filename design-systems/<slug>/assets/{id}.png. If the<slug>(derived from the filename) or{id}(derived from the wireframe processing of the image) contains shell metacharacters, it could lead to arbitrary command execution. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill integrates with well-known external services to fulfill its primary purpose.
- Evidence: It fetches configuration or assets via the
OpenRouterAPI for image generation and referencesGoogle Fontsfor typography in the generated HTML files.
Audit Metadata