openrouter-img
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The script
scripts/generate_image.pyautomatically attempts to load environment variables from a.envfile in the current working directory and from~/.envin the user's home directory. While this is a common practice for managing API keys, accessing these files exposes potentially sensitive credentials stored on the system to the agent context. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied image generation prompts and input images, which are passed to the OpenRouter API. The resulting output is written to the local filesystem. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions embedded in data could influence agent behavior or compromise output integrity.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through the
--promptand--input-imagearguments inscripts/generate_image.py. - Boundary markers: The skill does not implement delimiters or explicit instructions to ignore embedded commands within the prompt data.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to perform network operations (POST requests to OpenRouter) and write binary files to the local disk via
Path.write_bytes. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, validation, or escaping of the input prompt before it is interpolated into the API request body.
Audit Metadata