skills/rtadewald/skills/to-img/Gen Agent Trust Hub

to-img

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to construct and execute shell commands (uv run) using user-provided parameters such as prompt and filename. Although the instructions advise the agent to perform safe escaping, building shell commands through string interpolation of untrusted data is a classic command injection surface.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill depends on a script located at an external path (~/.agents/skills/openrouter-img/scripts/generate_image.py) which is not included in the skill's source files. This represents an unverifiable dependency executing code from a location outside the immediate project scope.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill explicitly directs the agent to read sensitive data (OPENROUTER_API_KEY) from .env or ~/.env. Accessing hidden environment files, particularly in the user's home directory, constitutes sensitive data exposure.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]:
  • Ingestion points: User-supplied image prompts, filenames, and aspect ratios processed by the agent (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: None identified; user input is interpolated directly into command arguments.
  • Capability inventory: Subprocess execution via uv run (SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: The skill includes a natural language instruction to "perform safe escaping," but lacks programmatic validation or strict schema enforcement for the inputs.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 18, 2026, 12:40 AM