to-img
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to construct and execute shell commands (
uv run) using user-provided parameters such aspromptandfilename. Although the instructions advise the agent to perform safe escaping, building shell commands through string interpolation of untrusted data is a classic command injection surface. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill depends on a script located at an external path (
~/.agents/skills/openrouter-img/scripts/generate_image.py) which is not included in the skill's source files. This represents an unverifiable dependency executing code from a location outside the immediate project scope. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill explicitly directs the agent to read sensitive data (
OPENROUTER_API_KEY) from.envor~/.env. Accessing hidden environment files, particularly in the user's home directory, constitutes sensitive data exposure. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]:
- Ingestion points: User-supplied image prompts, filenames, and aspect ratios processed by the agent (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: None identified; user input is interpolated directly into command arguments.
- Capability inventory: Subprocess execution via
uv run(SKILL.md). - Sanitization: The skill includes a natural language instruction to "perform safe escaping," but lacks programmatic validation or strict schema enforcement for the inputs.
Audit Metadata