video2html
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Several Python scripts in the
scripts/directory (mapa_movimento.py,analisar_video.py,gravar.py) use thesubprocessmodule to run system utilities such asffmpegandffprobefor video processing and metadata extraction. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted video files provided by the user, which are then analyzed by a multimodal model (Gemini via OpenRouter). The model's description of the movement is used to inform the agent's code generation process, creating a vulnerability where a crafted video could attempt to inject instructions into the generated HTML/JS.
- Ingestion points: User-provided video files (e.g.,
video-ref.mp4) are processed byanalisar_video.pyto generate analysis ingemini.md. - Boundary markers: None identified in the prompt templates or scripts to isolate the model-generated video description from functional instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes subprocess calls to
ffmpeg,uv, andffprobe, writes to the local file system (index.html,app.js), and performs network operations to the OpenRouter API. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of the multimodal model's output is performed before it is used for code generation.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation indicates the use of the
rembgtool, which automatically downloads large AI model files (~1GB) from public repositories during initial execution. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
gravar.pyscript uses Playwright'spage.evaluate()function to execute JavaScript code within the browser context. While used for legitimate state management during video recording, this represents a dynamic execution pattern.
Audit Metadata