issue-triage
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the GitHub CLI (
gh) andgitto interact with the local repository and the GitHub API. - Evidence includes data gathering commands (
gh repo view,gh issue list,gh pr list,gh api collaborators) and action commands (gh issue comment,gh issue edit,gh issue close) defined in Phase 1 and Phase 3 ofSKILL.md. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data from GitHub issues which could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Data is fetched from GitHub issue titles, bodies, and comments using
gh issue list(SKILL.md, Phase 1 & Phase 2). - Boundary markers: The subagent prompt in Phase 2 uses markdown formatting (e.g.,
**Body**: {body}) to separate fields, but lacks explicit instructions for the AI to ignore instructions embedded within the processed issue content. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses write-access capabilities to the GitHub repository, including the ability to post comments, modify labels, and close issues via the
ghtool. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input sanitization or filtering of issue content before it is processed by the AI subagent.
- Mitigation: The risk is significantly reduced by a mandatory human validation step in Phase 3, requiring the user to explicitly approve every action before it is executed.
Audit Metadata