install-mcp
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses several sensitive configuration files in the user's home directory, including
~/.claude.json,~/.cursor/mcp.json, and~/.zcode/cli/config.json. These files often contain API keys, server endpoints, and other security-sensitive settings for AI agents. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute file system modifications and potentially invoke other tools like
init-simple-memorixto complete installation tasks. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection surface because it ingests and processes data from external configuration files that could be modified by third parties or other processes.
- Ingestion points: Configuration data is read from paths such as
~/.claude.json,~/.cursor/mcp.json, and~/.workbuddy/mcp.jsoninto the agent's context. - Boundary markers: The instructions mention using a "dry-run" and creating backups, but do not provide explicit boundary markers or delimiters to protect the agent from instructions embedded within the configuration files.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write to sensitive configuration paths and execute additional installation logic.
- Sanitization: The skill instructions recommend checking the server entry schema and trust impact, but no technical sanitization or filtering of the ingested content is enforced.
Audit Metadata