sync-local-global-agents-skills
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 12, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads content from an untrusted third-party GitHub repository (
AVIDS2/memorix) via the GitHub API and raw content delivery networks. - Evidence:
fetchFromGitHubandfetchTreefunctions insrc/memorix.tstargethttps://api.github.com/repos/AVIDS2/memorix/contents/...andraw.githubusercontent.com. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill implements a 'download then execute' pattern by fetching files from a remote repository and writing them directly into the agent's skill directories (
~/.agents/skills). Since AI agent skills typically contain instructions or scripts that are executed by the platform, this allows a remote repository to influence or execute code on the local machine. - Evidence:
writeSkillFilesinsrc/memorix.tswrites buffers obtained from the network to the local filesystem without validation or sandboxing. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes powerful system commands to manipulate the filesystem and execute external CLI tools. It modifies directories for multiple applications including WorkBuddy, QoderWork, Kimi Work, and CodeBuddy.
- Evidence:
fetchFromCliinsrc/memorix.tsusesexecSyncto call thememorixCLI with dynamic arguments. - Evidence:
createDirLinkinsrc/sync.tsand the fallback scripts (fallback/sync.ps1,fallback/sync.sh) usesymlinkSync,mklink /J, andln -sto create filesystem links across sensitive application paths. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically generates filesystem structures and link mappings based on a hardcoded list of platforms, replacing existing directories with links to the downloaded content.
- Evidence:
syncPlatforminsrc/sync.tsdeletes existing directories and replaces them with symbolic links to the central skills directory. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from a remote source that is subsequently used as a source of instructions for an AI agent, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection if the remote repository is compromised.
- Ingestion points: GitHub repository
AVIDS2/memorix(viasrc/memorix.ts). - Boundary markers: None present; files are written verbatim to the skill directory.
- Capability inventory: Filesystem write, command execution (
execSync), and symbolic link creation. - Sanitization: No evidence of validation, sanitization, or integrity checks (other than SHA comparison for versioning) for the downloaded content.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata