sync-local-global-agents-skills

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 12, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads content from an untrusted third-party GitHub repository (AVIDS2/memorix) via the GitHub API and raw content delivery networks.
  • Evidence: fetchFromGitHub and fetchTree functions in src/memorix.ts target https://api.github.com/repos/AVIDS2/memorix/contents/... and raw.githubusercontent.com.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill implements a 'download then execute' pattern by fetching files from a remote repository and writing them directly into the agent's skill directories (~/.agents/skills). Since AI agent skills typically contain instructions or scripts that are executed by the platform, this allows a remote repository to influence or execute code on the local machine.
  • Evidence: writeSkillFiles in src/memorix.ts writes buffers obtained from the network to the local filesystem without validation or sandboxing.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes powerful system commands to manipulate the filesystem and execute external CLI tools. It modifies directories for multiple applications including WorkBuddy, QoderWork, Kimi Work, and CodeBuddy.
  • Evidence: fetchFromCli in src/memorix.ts uses execSync to call the memorix CLI with dynamic arguments.
  • Evidence: createDirLink in src/sync.ts and the fallback scripts (fallback/sync.ps1, fallback/sync.sh) use symlinkSync, mklink /J, and ln -s to create filesystem links across sensitive application paths.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically generates filesystem structures and link mappings based on a hardcoded list of platforms, replacing existing directories with links to the downloaded content.
  • Evidence: syncPlatform in src/sync.ts deletes existing directories and replaces them with symbolic links to the central skills directory.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from a remote source that is subsequently used as a source of instructions for an AI agent, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection if the remote repository is compromised.
  • Ingestion points: GitHub repository AVIDS2/memorix (via src/memorix.ts).
  • Boundary markers: None present; files are written verbatim to the skill directory.
  • Capability inventory: Filesystem write, command execution (execSync), and symbolic link creation.
  • Sanitization: No evidence of validation, sanitization, or integrity checks (other than SHA comparison for versioning) for the downloaded content.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Aug 12, 2026, 06:12 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — sync-local-global-agents-skills