add-gmail
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 24, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
npx -y @gongrzhe/server-gmail-autoauth-mcpto download and execute code from an unverified external source during both initial authorization and as a core part of the agent's tool configuration. Executing unvetted packages vianpxposes a high risk of supply chain attack. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill directs the user to store highly sensitive Google Cloud Platform OAuth keys (
gcp-oauth.keys.json) and Gmail access tokens (credentials.json) in the~/.gmail-mcp/directory. These credentials are then processed by the third-party package mentioned above, creating a risk of credential harvesting or unauthorized data access. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The 'Channel Mode' implementation introduces a significant vulnerability to indirect prompt injection by processing incoming emails and interpolating their content directly into the agent's prompt in
src/index.ts. - Ingestion points: Email bodies fetched via the Gmail MCP in
checkForNewEmails(). - Boundary markers: The skill uses
<email>and<body>tags but does not provide explicit instructions to the AI to ignore any malicious commands contained within those tags. - Capability inventory: The agent is granted tools to send emails, list labels, and interact with the local filesystem and shell.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of content filtering or sanitization before the email body is passed to the LLM.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes various shell commands to modify the environment, including
launchctlfor service management,mkdirfor credential storage, and./build.shfor rebuilding the local container environment with the new Gmail integration.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata