video-extend
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the
runcomfyCLI tool to interact with Google Veo 3-1 models. The instructions explicitly scope these commands to theruncomfybinary and use JSON-encoded inputs to mitigate shell injection risks. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references the installation of the
@runcomfy/clipackage via NPM. This represents a standard installation procedure for the vendor's official command-line utility. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process external, untrusted data in the form of video URLs, creating a surface for potential injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: External video URLs are passed to the
runcomfy runcommand withinSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The documentation specifies that inputs are passed as JSON strings to prevent shell-level injection. It also includes a security section advising the agent to be aware of potentially malicious content embedded in reference videos.
- Capability inventory: The skill is restricted to running the
runcomfytool via Bash, which performs network operations to the vendor's API and file downloads to a local directory. - Sanitization: While the CLI avoids shell expansion for its arguments, the skill relies on the upstream model's internal safety filters to handle potentially malicious content within the video frames themselves.
Audit Metadata