flash

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 5, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the creation of serverless endpoints that process untrusted user input as part of their primary function (e.g., LLM prompts, data for preprocessing).
  • Ingestion points: Inputs are received as keyword arguments in @app.queue functions and as JSON bodies in @app.api methods (e.g., examples/api_model_service.py, examples/queue_gpu.py).
  • Boundary markers: None explicitly provided in the instruction templates; the skill relies on the underlying LLM's safety features.
  • Capability inventory: Workers have access to network volumes for persistent storage, can perform network operations to download model weights from HuggingFace, and execute Python code in a containerized environment.
  • Sanitization: Not explicitly documented in the provided examples; standard practice for these services assumes the application logic or model handles content safety.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The development workflow utilizes serialization for remote execution.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md (Gotcha 11) notes that rp flash dev sessions and tasks ship code pickled by the local interpreter to remote workers. While this is a standard feature of the vendor's development loop for syncing local code to remote GPUs, it involves the transmission and execution of serialized objects.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 5, 2026, 01:03 AM