flash
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the creation of serverless endpoints that process untrusted user input as part of their primary function (e.g., LLM prompts, data for preprocessing).
- Ingestion points: Inputs are received as keyword arguments in
@app.queuefunctions and as JSON bodies in@app.apimethods (e.g.,examples/api_model_service.py,examples/queue_gpu.py). - Boundary markers: None explicitly provided in the instruction templates; the skill relies on the underlying LLM's safety features.
- Capability inventory: Workers have access to network volumes for persistent storage, can perform network operations to download model weights from HuggingFace, and execute Python code in a containerized environment.
- Sanitization: Not explicitly documented in the provided examples; standard practice for these services assumes the application logic or model handles content safety.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The development workflow utilizes serialization for remote execution.
- Evidence:
SKILL.md(Gotcha 11) notes thatrp flash devsessions and tasks ship code pickled by the local interpreter to remote workers. While this is a standard feature of the vendor's development loop for syncing local code to remote GPUs, it involves the transmission and execution of serialized objects.
Audit Metadata