telegram
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill installs the
tg-kitutility from the author's GitHub repository using theuvtool manager. This is a core part of the skill's functionality to enable Telegram interaction. - Evidence:
command -v tg || uv tool install 'git+https://github.com/ruslan-korneev/tg-kit'inSKILL.md. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing the
tgcommand-line tool for all Telegram-related operations, including reading chat history, sending messages, and calling MTProto methods. - Evidence: Extensive documentation of
tgsubcommands likesend,read,press, andrawthroughoutSKILL.mdandreferences/raw.md. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from external sources (Telegram messages and bot responses), which creates a potential surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points:
tg read,tg msg,tg search, andtg dialogscommands inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill instructions do not specify explicit delimiters for the agent to use when interpreting message content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to write files via
tg downloadand communicate externally viatg sendand other write commands. - Sanitization: The tool includes a safety guard and allowlist mechanism (
tg allow) that requires explicit user confirmation before sending data to third-party peers, mitigating the risk of automated exfiltration via injection.
Audit Metadata