dossier-collect

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 13, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the Bash tool to perform automated investigations, including searching the codebase and environment. Shell access combined with recursive logic increases the risk of unintended command execution.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The instructions mandate the use of WebSearch and WebFetch to download and process content from external sources, such as public GitHub profiles and web pages, which are outside the agent's control.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill's primary function is to aggregate information from local sources (codebase, memory stores, ADR indexes) and use it to drive outbound web searches and fetches. This creates a technical path where sensitive local data could be exposed to external services.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8) because it recursively ingests untrusted data from the internet and local files to drive its next steps.
  • Ingestion points: WebFetch, WebSearch, Read, and mcp__claude-flow__memory_search_unified are used to pull external and internal data into the prompt context.
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not define delimiters or protective instructions to prevent the agent from following commands embedded in the fetched content.
  • Capability inventory: The inclusion of Bash, Write, and mcp__claude-flow__memory_store tools provides a high-impact surface for an attacker to exploit via injected instructions.
  • Sanitization: Extraction is performed via simple regex/heuristics, which does not provide safety-level sanitization against malicious instructions.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jun 13, 2026, 01:22 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — dossier-collect