agent-dev-backend-api
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's
hookssection (pre_execution, post_execution, on_error) utilizesnpx claude-flow@alpha. This command automatically fetches the specified package from the public NPM registry at runtime. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The use of
npxto runclaude-flow@alphaconstitutes remote code execution, as the package is downloaded and executed in the user's environment without explicit version pinning or integrity verification. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: In the
post_executionhook, the skill transmits$TASK_OUTPUT(the generated API code) and$TASK_CONTEXTto theclaude-flowtool via thememory store-patternandneural traincommands. This sends potentially sensitive intellectual property to an external utility. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The shell scripts in the
hookssection interpolate variables like$TASKand$TASK_CONTEXTdirectly into shell commands. This creates a risk of command injection if these variables contain shell metacharacters. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a 'self-learning' mechanism that ingests existing project files.
- Ingestion points:
find . -name "*.route.js" -o -name "*.controller.js"in thepre_executionhook. - Boundary markers: None present to distinguish between instructions and data.
- Capability inventory:
Bash,Write,Edit,Read,MultiEdit,Tasktools are all enabled. - Sanitization: No visible sanitization or validation of the ingested files before they are processed by the learning protocol.
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