agent-dev-backend-api

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's hooks section (pre_execution, post_execution, on_error) utilizes npx claude-flow@alpha. This command automatically fetches the specified package from the public NPM registry at runtime.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The use of npx to run claude-flow@alpha constitutes remote code execution, as the package is downloaded and executed in the user's environment without explicit version pinning or integrity verification.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: In the post_execution hook, the skill transmits $TASK_OUTPUT (the generated API code) and $TASK_CONTEXT to the claude-flow tool via the memory store-pattern and neural train commands. This sends potentially sensitive intellectual property to an external utility.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The shell scripts in the hooks section interpolate variables like $TASK and $TASK_CONTEXT directly into shell commands. This creates a risk of command injection if these variables contain shell metacharacters.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a 'self-learning' mechanism that ingests existing project files.
  • Ingestion points: find . -name "*.route.js" -o -name "*.controller.js" in the pre_execution hook.
  • Boundary markers: None present to distinguish between instructions and data.
  • Capability inventory: Bash, Write, Edit, Read, MultiEdit, Task tools are all enabled.
  • Sanitization: No visible sanitization or validation of the ingested files before they are processed by the learning protocol.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 15, 2026, 11:37 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — agent-dev-backend-api