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Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains an indirect prompt injection and shell expansion surface within the coordinator framework hooks defined in the frontmatter of SKILL.md.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted external input enters the context via the
$TASKenvironment variable processed during the lifecycle hooks. - Boundary markers: No delimiters, escaping, or strict validation structures are defined to isolate the content of the
$TASKvariable. - Capability inventory: The platform executes defined shell strings via
preandposthooks, invokingechoandmemory_storeutilities. - Sanitization: The
$TASKvariable is directly interpolated inside double quotes within a shell context block, which does not prevent bash command substitution (e.g.,$(...)) if an adversarial task description is supplied.
Audit Metadata