skills/ruvnet/ruflo/agent-planner/Gen Agent Trust Hub

agent-planner

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains an indirect prompt injection and shell expansion surface within the coordinator framework hooks defined in the frontmatter of SKILL.md.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted external input enters the context via the $TASK environment variable processed during the lifecycle hooks.
  • Boundary markers: No delimiters, escaping, or strict validation structures are defined to isolate the content of the $TASK variable.
  • Capability inventory: The platform executes defined shell strings via pre and post hooks, invoking echo and memory_store utilities.
  • Sanitization: The $TASK variable is directly interpolated inside double quotes within a shell context block, which does not prevent bash command substitution (e.g., $(...)) if an adversarial task description is supplied.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 15, 2026, 11:37 AM