agent-v3-queen-coordinator

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses npx to download and run the agentic-flow@alpha package during both pre-execution and post-execution hooks. Using an unpinned version tag (@alpha) from a non-standardized external source introduces a supply chain risk.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The use of npx in the pre_execution and post_execution hooks constitutes remote code execution, as it fetches and executes JavaScript from the npm registry at runtime.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The post_execution hook contains a shell command injection vulnerability where the $TASK environment variable is interpolated directly into a shell string: echo "V3 Orchestration: $TASK". If the task content contains shell metacharacters (e.g., backticks or semicolons), it could lead to arbitrary command execution on the host system.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an attack surface for indirect prompt injection due to its role in orchestrating a 15-agent swarm.
  • Ingestion points: The skill ingests untrusted data via the $TASK variable in the post_execution hook.
  • Boundary markers: There are no visible boundary markers or delimiters used to isolate task data from the command structure.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive capabilities including shell execution (hooks), GitHub CLI interactions (gh), and the ability to coordinate and pass tasks to 14 other specialized agents.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping is performed on the $TASK variable before it is used in shell hooks.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 15, 2026, 11:37 AM