agent-v3-queen-coordinator
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses
npxto download and run theagentic-flow@alphapackage during both pre-execution and post-execution hooks. Using an unpinned version tag (@alpha) from a non-standardized external source introduces a supply chain risk. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The use of
npxin thepre_executionandpost_executionhooks constitutes remote code execution, as it fetches and executes JavaScript from the npm registry at runtime. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
post_executionhook contains a shell command injection vulnerability where the$TASKenvironment variable is interpolated directly into a shell string:echo "V3 Orchestration: $TASK". If the task content contains shell metacharacters (e.g., backticks or semicolons), it could lead to arbitrary command execution on the host system. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an attack surface for indirect prompt injection due to its role in orchestrating a 15-agent swarm.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests untrusted data via the
$TASKvariable in thepost_executionhook. - Boundary markers: There are no visible boundary markers or delimiters used to isolate task data from the command structure.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive capabilities including shell execution (hooks), GitHub CLI interactions (
gh), and the ability to coordinate and pass tasks to 14 other specialized agents. - Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping is performed on the
$TASKvariable before it is used in shell hooks.
Audit Metadata