autopilot-loop
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection because it autonomously processes and executes tasks derived from external, potentially untrusted sources.
- Ingestion points: In
SKILL.md, the autopilot is configured to discover tasks fromteam-tasks(Claude Code TaskList),swarm-tasks(MCP task_list), andfile-checklist(Markdown checkbox items in tracked files). - Boundary markers: No boundary markers, delimiters, or system instructions are provided to help the agent distinguish between legitimate task data and potentially malicious instructions embedded within those sources.
- Capability inventory: The skill leverages the
Agenttool to spawn sub-agents and usesmcp__claude-flow__autopilot_predictto determine next actions, which can include sensitive operations like editing code or running tests. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation or content sanitization applied to the tasks retrieved from the external sources before they are passed to the prediction and execution logic.
Audit Metadata