git-workflow
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill recommends the use of
npx @claude-flow/cli@latest. This operation downloads and executes the latest version of the@claude-flow/clipackage from the NPM registry. The package name aligns with themcp__claude-flowtools listed in the skill configuration, suggesting it is a component of the same workflow ecosystem. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the
Bashtool to perform local Git operations such as branching, merging, and rebasing, as well as executing the recommended CLI tool. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its core function of analyzing external, potentially untrusted data.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests repository data, health metrics, and code differences using
mcp__claude-flow__github_repo_analyze,mcp__claude-flow__analyze_diff, and related tools (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: There are no explicit boundary markers or instructions to the agent to disregard instructions embedded within the analyzed repository content or PR bodies.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to execute shell commands via
Bashand modify repository states (e.g., managing PRs) viamcp__claude-flow__github_pr_manage(SKILL.md). - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the ingested repository content is mentioned in the skill instructions.
Audit Metadata