memory-management
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill invokes
npx @claude-flow/cliacross multiple commands and scripts. Usingnpxwith an unpinned external package from the public registry downloads and executes code dynamically at runtime, introducing a package supply chain risk. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on direct execution of shell commands and custom shell scripts (
scripts/memory-backup.shandscripts/memory-consolidate.sh) to orchestrate its core memory backup, statistics, and optimization workflows. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]:
- Ingestion points: Untrusted external inputs or conversational history enter the agent context dynamically via the
memory storeandmemory searchcommands insideSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit boundary markers, escaping rules, or system instructions defined to separate untrusted text inputs from structural prompt logic.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses shell execution capabilities across all files through the use of the
@claude-flow/clitool and shell scripts. - Sanitization: Input content is stored directly into the namespace fields without active sanitization or verification, allowing a potentially malicious instruction stored in memory to execute when later retrieved during semantic search operations.
Audit Metadata