pod-sales
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from external templates (
templates/sales.json) and an external agent registry to construct prompts, creating a surface for potential injection. - Ingestion points:
templates/sales.json, ruflo's agent registry (referenced in SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: Absent; no delimiters or "ignore instructions" are specified for the constructed prompts.
- Capability inventory: File system access via Bash for writing ledgers and BBS logs, and command execution for running simulation scripts.
- Sanitization: Partial; while schema validation is mentioned for the pod template, no sanitization or escaping is described for the prompt construction process.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill resolves agent configurations against an external entity called "ruflo's agent registry."
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the
Bashtool to execute thepod-tick.mjsscript and manage file-based budget and status stores.
Audit Metadata