automate-me
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes historical conversation transcripts to extract user preferences. If past conversations contained malicious payloads, they could theoretically influence the generated skill.
- Ingestion points: Workspace session store transcripts (Step 1).
- Boundary markers: Instructions limit mining to the current workspace scope and require pattern verification across multiple slices of history.
- Capability inventory: The agent is permitted to read transcripts, write skill files, and perform git operations.
- Sanitization: A refinement step (Step 5) uses the 'unslop' skill and authoring guidelines to filter and normalize the drafted prose.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes local shell commands for metadata retrieval and version control.
- Evidence: Step 0 uses
git logto check file edit history. Step 6 utilizesgit worktreeandgit commitfor change management. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill accesses user transcripts and home directory paths to fulfill its primary function.
- Evidence: Step 0 searches
~/.agents/skills/*-mode/SKILL.md. Step 1 reads the workspace's session store. - Mitigation: The skill contains explicit warnings to the agent not to "glob across other workspaces' transcripts" to prevent cross-workspace data leakage.
Audit Metadata