code-atlas
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive configuration files, including
.envanddocker-compose.yml, to identify environment variable keys for its architecture maps. - Evidence: Found in
SKILL.md(Layer 6 discovery) andSECURITY.md(SEC-01). - Mitigation: The skill implements strict redaction controls (SEC-01, SEC-09, SEC-15) to ensure that sensitive values are never written to the atlas, graph artifacts, or bug reports.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a surface area for indirect prompt injection because it ingests and analyzes untrusted source code and metadata from external repositories.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via the
codebase_pathinSKILL.mdwhen reading source files, READMEs, and configuration manifests. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands present in the
revieweroranalyzeragent prompts defined inAPI-CONTRACTS.md. - Capability inventory: Exploitable capabilities include the ability to perform
git pushoperations (SEC-19) and execute system commands for diagram rendering viasubprocess.run(SEC-06). - Sanitization: Extensive sanitization controls (SEC-03, SEC-10, SEC-11, SEC-12) are applied to all diagram labels and bug report content to prevent injection at the output layer.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes external visualization tools, such as
dot(Graphviz) andmmdc(Mermaid CLI), to render diagram source files into SVGs. - Evidence: Documented in
publication-guide.md(SVG Generation Commands) andSECURITY.md(SEC-06). - Mitigation: All command execution is performed using
subprocess.runwith argument arrays to prevent shell injection, and the use ofshell=Trueis strictly forbidden by SEC-06.
Audit Metadata